Introduction
The 2025 UEFA Champions League final between Real Madrid and Borussia Dortmund delivered a tactical spectacle that left many questioning the effectiveness of Carlo Ancelotti’s strategic choices. With the final scoreline favoring Dortmund, Real Madrid’s tactical setup, particularly the deployment of a three-center-back system, became a significant point of analysis. While Ancelotti’s 3-4-3 formation is often praised for its stability and balance, it turned into a vulnerability against a high-paced, counter-attacking Borussia Dortmund side. Dortmund’s clinical transitions exposed the flaws in Madrid’s defensive system, particularly when the high press and wide play created gaping spaces for counter-attacks.
This article aims to dissect the tactical dynamics of the final, analyze Ancelotti’s decision to deploy a three-center-back system, and explore why it became a crucial weakness that Dortmund capitalized on, ultimately driving their victory.
1. Ancelotti’s Tactical Setup: The 3-4-3 System
Carlo Ancelotti is known for his tactical flexibility, and in this final, he opted for a 3-4-3 formation, a structure designed to provide both offensive width and defensive stability. The idea behind this system was to allow Real Madrid to dominate possession and control the midfield while having the flexibility to stretch Dortmund’s defense through wide attacking plays.
1.1. The Defensive Setup
The three-center-back system consisted of Antonio Rudiger, David Alaba, and Éder Militão as the central defenders. This arrangement theoretically gave Real Madrid more numbers at the back, enabling them to deal with Dortmund’s pace and width. The wingbacks, Dani Carvajal and Ferland Mendy, were tasked with providing additional support in defense and contributing to offensive transitions.
However, this setup came with its risks. The central defenders were often required to step out into the midfield to help with possession buildup or to deal with Dortmund’s counter-attacks. The lack of a natural defensive midfielder to protect the backline left gaps that Dortmund’s rapid wingers, especially Jude Bellingham and Giovanni Reyna, would exploit throughout the match.
1.2. The Midfield Control
In midfield, Real Madrid relied on Luka Modrić and Casemiro to control possession and dictate play. Modrić’s creativity was essential in linking up with the attack, while Casemiro’s defensive abilities were meant to shield the backline. However, the absence of a true defensive midfielder with the pace and mobility to cover for the advancing center-backs meant that the midfield was frequently bypassed by Dortmund’s quick counters.
2. Borussia Dortmund’s Counter-Attacking Threat
Borussia Dortmund, under their manager, employed a 4-2-3-1 formation, designed to absorb pressure and exploit spaces on the counter. With a dynamic forward line consisting of Erling Haaland, Giovanni Reyna, and Jude Bellingham, Dortmund was always looking to transition quickly and take advantage of the spaces left by Real Madrid’s high press.
2.1. The Speed of Transition
Dortmund’s ability to break at high speed was their main weapon throughout the final. The combination of Bellingham’s intelligence, Reyna’s dribbling, and Haaland’s finishing prowess created a devastating counter-attacking trio. Real Madrid’s center-backs were often caught in no man’s land, forced to chase back and recover as Dortmund moved the ball swiftly from defense to attack.
2.2. Exploiting the Spaces Left by the Three-Center-Backs
The three-center-back formation, while theoretically solid, left significant spaces on the wings and in the half-spaces between the center-backs. When Real Madrid pressed forward in an attempt to dominate possession, the width of the pitch became a problem. Dortmund’s fullbacks, particularly Raphael Guerreiro, found space to get forward, and when combined with their attacking midfielders, they were able to exploit the spaces between the three central defenders and the wingbacks.
Real Madrid’s pressing strategy left them vulnerable to quick transitions, as the high position of the center-backs meant they were often too far from goal to prevent the counter-attacks. When Real Madrid lost the ball in advanced positions, Dortmund capitalized with quick passes into space, often catching the Madrid defenders off guard.
3. The Vulnerabilities of the Three-Center-Back System Against Counter-Attacks
The high pressing game employed by Ancelotti required the center-backs to step up and engage with the ball in advanced positions. This created significant space behind them that Dortmund’s quick attackers were quick to exploit.
3.1. Lack of Defensive Cover in Wide Areas
One of the primary vulnerabilities of a three-center-back system is the exposure of wide areas. With only two wingbacks providing coverage, the central defenders can become stretched when the opposition attacks down the wings. In the final, Dortmund’s wide players, particularly Guerreiro on the left, were able to push forward, drawing Real Madrid’s center-backs out of position. When the ball was quickly switched to the opposite side, the Madrid defense often failed to recover in time.
Dortmund’s ability to stretch the defense horizontally made it difficult for the center-backs to maintain a solid shape. The fullbacks, Carvajal and Mendy, were frequently caught in two minds, trying to track the opposition wingers while also providing support in the attack. This left gaps in the defensive structure that Dortmund exploited with their fast transitions.
3.2. The Over-reliance on Rudiger and Alaba
While Alaba and Rudiger are both experienced defenders, their ability to deal with counter-attacks was tested by the sheer pace and directness of Dortmund’s front line. Alaba, known for his intelligence and passing range, was often caught out of position when he pushed forward to contribute to the attack, leaving Rudiger to cover large spaces alone.
Rudiger, despite his physical presence and leadership qualities, was often forced into situations where he had to recover rapidly, something that was difficult given the speed of Dortmund’s counter-attacks. The combination of Alaba’s forward runs and Rudiger’s lack of speed in recovering left Madrid vulnerable on multiple occasions.
3.3. The Strain on the Midfield
Casemiro, a player usually reliable in breaking up opposition attacks, struggled with his positioning during the high press. His inability to cover the spaces left by Madrid’s advanced center-backs meant that Dortmund had the freedom to move the ball through the midfield and into dangerous attacking positions. Modrić, who typically drops deeper to help in possession, was also caught in possession several times during transitions, further exacerbating Madrid’s defensive problems.
4. The Breakthrough Goal: A Case Study in Tactical Vulnerability
The first goal for Dortmund came after a well-executed counter-attack, exploiting the spaces left by Real Madrid’s high-pressing system. Bellingham won the ball back in midfield after a misplaced pass by Casemiro and quickly played a through ball to Reyna, who sprinted down the right wing. As the Madrid defense scrambled to get back into shape, Haaland was found in acres of space in the box, finishing off a well-worked counter-attack.
This goal encapsulated the tactical flaws in Ancelotti’s approach. The high pressing left Madrid exposed to quick transitions, and the lack of defensive cover in wide areas made it easy for Dortmund to exploit these gaps. The center-backs were too high up the pitch, and when they were caught out, they were unable to recover in time to prevent the goal.
5. Lessons for Ancelotti: Tactical Adjustments for Future Games
While Ancelotti’s high-pressing 3-4-3 formation has been effective in many situations, the final against Dortmund exposed significant weaknesses in this setup, particularly when facing a team with rapid attackers and a counter-attacking style. For future matches, Ancelotti may need to consider the following adjustments:
5.1. A Deeper Defensive Line
To counteract the dangers of fast counters, Ancelotti could opt for a deeper defensive line. This would reduce the space behind the defense and force opposing attackers to play through a more compact system. It would also limit the need for center-backs to recover over long distances.
5.2. More Defensive Midfield Protection
Introducing a more defensively-minded midfielder, such as Casemiro alongside a more mobile ball-winner, could help protect the backline and provide better coverage in transitional phases. This would also allow the wingbacks to stay more disciplined in defense, reducing the strain on the center-backs.
5.3. A More Balanced Attack
While the 3-4-3 formation provides width, Real Madrid’s offensive play often lacked balance. By using a more traditional 4-3-3 setup with a solid defensive midfield presence, Ancelotti could ensure more control in the center of the pitch and reduce the gaps that Dortmund exploited.
6. Conclusion: The Tactical Lesson from Real Madrid’s Defeat
The 2025 UEFA Champions League final was a tactical battle that highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of Ancelotti’s approach. While the 3-4-3 system provided attacking options, it ultimately failed to cope with the fast counter-attacking game of Borussia Dortmund. The vulnerabilities in the wide areas, the lack of defensive cover in midfield, and the pace of Dortmund’s attackers were key factors in Real Madrid’s downfall.
For Ancelotti, the lesson from this defeat is clear: a high-pressing system is only effective when the defensive structure is solid enough to deal with the spaces it creates. Moving forward, a more balanced approach, with greater attention to defensive protection, will be crucial for ensuring Real Madrid’s continued success in high-stakes matches like this.
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